MEASUREMENT OF EVIDENCE
The measurement of evidence is getting a lot of press these days in connection with biomedical research. Unfortunately, a lot of it is bad press. The headlines tell an alarming story: "Odds are, it's wrong" (Siegfried, 2010) , "The truth wears off" (Lehrer 2010), "Why most published research findings are false" (Ioannidis, 2005) . These articles -appearing in both scientific venues and the popular press -document how consistently we are misled by the evidence, as defined by results of published statistical analyses. Examples abound in clinical trials, genetic studies, and other biomedical settings.
They say there's no such thing as bad publicity, but we beg to disagree. This state of affairs is not good for statistics and it is not good for biomedical research. The recent spate of exposés threatens to undermine an already unsteady détente between biologists, who are in need of quantitative methods for understanding data, and the statisticians who, at least in principle, are best positioned to provide them.
Arguably, what we have on our hands is at least in part a basic failure to communicate. Scientists are almost always posing evidential questions: they are trying to assess the degree to which hypotheses regarding biological processes are supported or not by the data at hand. In response, statisticians typically offer pvalues, which answer questions about the probability distributions of all possible sets of data given a particular hypothesis -quite different questions than the ones that the scientists are asking. The p-value is a perfectly valid answer to a particular question, but logical objections to using it to represent evidence seem unassailable. (See, e.g., Royall, 1997 for a particularly lucid and accessible discussion of this point.) To ask for the evidence is to ask a question regarding an hypothesis H given particular data D; to report the p-value is to say something about the probability distribution of all possible sets of data D given a particular H. It should come as no surprise to anyone that systematic reliance on the latter to make inferences regarding the former could tend to lead us astray.
The urge to blur the linguistic boundary between what would constitute an answer to the biologist's question and the quantity the statistician can readily calculate seems irresistible. Mainstream statistical methodology in modern biomedical research seems to have alit on just such a solution, taking the p-value as a measure of the strength of the evidence while at the same time requiring that biologists learn to ask questions for which the p-value, rather than the evidence, is the answer, namely questions regarding long-run sampling probabilities under a null hypothesis. Surely this completely illogical compromise -which achieves rigor on neither the biological nor the statistical side, and which leads to considerable linguistic slippage in communicating statistical results -plays an important role in the problems surveyed in the papers referenced above by Siegfied, Lehrer, and Ioannidis, respectively.
We are certainly not the first to call attention to problems with using p-values and related statistics as if they were measures of evidence. Indeed, the problem of quantifying statistical evidence has been a research topic in its own right going back at least to Fisher (see, e.g., Fisher, 1956) if not well before that; see also, for example, (Hacking, 1965; Edwards, 1992; Evans, 1997; Royall, 1997; Goodman, 1999) and the many others cited by these sources. There are also some illustrious statisticians who defend the p-value itself as a measure of evidence (see, e.g., Berger, 2003) . We ourselves have argued that this is a mistake in scientific applications (Vieland, 1998; Vieland and Hodge, 1998; Strug and Hodge, 2006; Vieland, 2006; Vieland, 2011) and will not rehearse our own arguments again here.
Instead, what we would like to do here is to propose reframing the question of how to measure statistical evidence, considering it not as a statistical problem per se, but rather, as a measurement problem. Here is what we mean by this. Virtually all statistical work in this area starts with the question, "What statistical properties would we like our measures of evidence to have?" These properties generally include the kinds of things statisticians traditionally care about, things related to control of error probabilities, asymptotic convergence, connections with parameter estimation (see, e.g., Lele, 2004) , or more abstract considerations such as concordance between frequentist and Bayesian methodologies (see, e.g., Berger, 2003) . We propose instead starting with the question, "What properties does evidence have, and how can we ensure that our measures of evidence capture these properties?"
The change in perspective implicit in this reframing of the central question may seem slight, but it leads us to seek a very different kind of solution. This is because rather than turning to the statistical literature for assistance in designing an evidence measure with good statistical properties, we turn instead to the measurement literature (see, e.g., Hand, 2004) , in order to devise methods that appropriately quantify what we mean by "evidence." And in fact, once we broaden our inquiry to neighboring literatures, we find that a solution already exists to a thorny measurement problem astonishingly similar to ours, as we describe below.
But before proceeding we need to mention some things we will not be talking about, to avoid unnecessary distractions. We are not interested here in hypothesis testing, parameter estimation, the measurement of error probabilities associated with particular tests, or the rational rank-ordering of beliefs. Our topic is not decision making or even inductive inference writ large, but rather, the narrowly construed one of measurement of a particular quantity -the evidence -which we believe has a particularly important place in the application of statistical methods to biological data. It may well turn out that a new footing for measurement of evidence will show some deep connections to developments in these other statistical areas; certainly we expect deep connections to the work of Jaynes (1957; 1988) and possibly Cox (1961) , for reasons that should become clear below. But we do not presuppose these connections or make any attempt to incorporate them as we go. We also make no claims to be moving towards a general theory of evidence, as that word is broadly applied in ordinary language or other venues such as law courts. We focus here solely on the measurement of evidence in connection with statistical analysis of biological data.
THE MEASUREMENT PERSPECTIVE
Adopting a measurement perspective means distinguishing between the thing being measured and the measurement values assigned to that thing. This already suggests a radical break with the conventional statistical view, in which we tend to conflate the p-value (or some alternative statistic) with the evidence, rather than considering it as the measurable quantity used to infer the evidence, while the evidence itself remains hidden from direct view. But the p-value, or the LR or any other summary statistic, cannot itself be the evidence, any more than the tick mark on the side of the thermometer is itself the temperature. Even the numerical value associated with that tick mark -say, 50 in Fahrenheit units -represents a conventional (albeit rigorously derivable) assignment used to describe the temperature, but not the temperature. We may say "the temperature is 50 degrees," but a more correct wording would be, "the temperature can be represented by the number 50 on the Fahrenheit scale."
The practical consequence of making this distinction is that it enables us to ask about the behavior of the evidence separately from considering the behavior of any prospective evidence measure. As Figure 1 illustrates, we have some shared feel for statistical evidence that yields orderings of evidence even before we attempt to assign meaningful measurement units. Thus we have a set of natural experiments -in the form of thought experiments -that we can perform to obtain a feel for how evidence behaves prior to devising an evidence measurement scale. True, our sensation of evidence may only be reliable under certain simple circumstances, but this is not a problem unique to our field. For instance, the measurement of temperature also begins with our sensations of rising or falling levels of heat as a guide, even though our sensations are bounded by the limits of our tolerance and sensitivity to heat and cold, and they are also susceptible to trickery (see Vieland, 2006 , for additional discussion).
Another benefit of the measurement perspective is that we can now name the particular type of measurement problem we're facing, viz., nomic measurement (Chang, 2004) , i.e., measurement of a quantity that is itself not directly -
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observable, based on application of an underlying law. Nomic measurement represents a particularly abstruse problem, but it has some very mundane applications. For example, the measurement of temperature based on the height of a column of mercury represents a nomic measurement operation. The idea is to measure a quantity X (temperature) on the basis of some observable phenomenon Y (expansion of mercury when heated), through a law f(Y) = X expressing X as a function of Y (Figure 2) . But a little thought will reveal that the law itself can be neither empirically discovered nor empirically verified, because this would require knowing the true value of X, which is obtained only subsequent to application of the law. This apparent circularity did not, however, prevent physicists from developing a body of fundamental theory, which we now know as thermodynamics, in the context of which temperature can be measured in a mathematically rigorous manner. (The interested reader is referred to Chang for a full account of the physicists' approach.)
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Figure 2: Another nomic measurement problem: measuring temperature via the volume of mercury in an ordinary thermometer
The problem of nomic measurement arises whenever we want to measure an unobservable quantity X based on some observable phenomenon Y, through a law in the form f(Y) = X. Such laws are not directly verifiable, but can be validated only in the context of the theoretical frameworks in which they are embedded. In the case of temperature, a fully rigorous method for calibrating ordinary thermometers, which measure temperature T via the volume V of a liquid, required the development of fundamental thermodynamics. ------------------------------
The physicists' solution to their nomic measurement problem is on its face astonishingly abstract; it depends very little on actual properties of physical systems beyond a few basic laws. Furthermore, fundamental thermodynamic quantities have been fruitfully invoked in connection with non-physical systems, in information theory and probability theory (Shannon, 1948; Kulback, 1997; Caticha, 2003; Jaynes, 2003; Graham and Kim, 2008) . Key concepts such as entropy already tether these fields together at numerous junctions. There are indeed many parallels between the evidential measurement problem and thermometry. Evidence itself even seems to share some formal characteristics with temperature; this topic has been explored elsewhere (Vieland, 2006; Vieland, 2011) and will not be revisited here. But we will draw on the temperatureevidence connection to sketch the form of a new framework for (paraphrasing Chang) inventing evidence.
EVIDENCE OF MEASUREMENT
Evidence that we are engaged specifically in measurement comes from the types of questions we ask regarding calculation results. Adopting a measurement perspective means above all worrying about measurement scale. Measurement scale, in turn, requires attention to concatenation. For instance, the combined length of two boards each of length 1' when laid end to end must be 1' + 1' = 2', and also must be decomposable through the reverse operation, so that the lengths of the individual boards are each 2' -1' = 1'. It is only by way of this form of concatenation of length measurements that the statement that length of a single board is, say, 1', gets its particular meaning: 1' means the amount by which 1' is increased to arrive at 2', and also, the amount by which 2' is reduced to arrive at 1'. If we find ourselves engaged in calculations for which concatenation is not an issue, then we are not engaged in measurement.
To meaningfully measure the evidence in one set of data, we must have a measurement scale that yields proper evidence measures across sets of data (or as data are accumulated), and vice versa. These objectives are two sides of the same coin. Deriving a meaningful evidential measurement scale mandates that the evidence for one set of data considered jointly with another must have a particular, mathematically structured, relationship to the evidence associated with each data set on its own.
Neither p -values nor other seemingly sensible statistically based candidates for evidence measures, such as maximum likelihood ratios, show even remotely sensible behavior under concatenation of data (Vieland, 2006; Hodge and Vieland, 2010) . A clear example is the so-called "winner's curse," in which we can add new data supporting the alternative hypothesis to a data set already supporting the alternative hypothesis, but the evidence appears to go down (see also Huang & Vieland, 2001) . Moreover, this happens sometimes, but not always, so that beyond a handful of clear-cut cases, we have no agreed-upon methodology for evaluating whether the evidence as measured by any given statistic is going in the right direction. Thus we really have no way to know whether this is an anomalous, infrequent phenomenon, or a far deeper impediment to objective measurement of evidence. Imagine having a yardstick that might contract or expand as you were using it, with no way for you to know when it was doing so! Before we can even know whether our evidence measures are behaving properly as evidence accumulates, we need a methodological framework in the context of which the issue can be rigorously examined. Here we begin to sketch out one such framework in a heuristic manner, following the general proposal in Vieland (2011) .
Let us assume for the moment that there is something called evidential energy, conveyed by but distinct from the data themselves, which can flow from one set of data to another, changing the amount of evidence in the process. (We assume throughout that we have two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses of interest, say, H and not-H, and data that contain information relevant to the distinction between these hypotheses. Note that in this usage, information itself is related to but is not the same as evidence. For example, our data might contain a great deal of information regarding the hypotheses, yet be neutral in terms of evidence supporting one over the other. See Vieland (2011) for additional details.) We can picture distinct data sets as separate systems occupying various (metaphorical) boxes. Now we might imagine different types of walls for these boxes: impermeable walls, which allow no communication between systems; walls that allow evidential energy, but not data, to flow between systems; and walls that allow the data in different boxes to freely intermix. What we are interested in is the new state of the evidence that results when an impermeable wall is replaced with either of the other two types of walls, forming a new composite system in which evidential energy and/or data are allowed to combine. This image provides a pictorial aid for understanding the following restatement of the fundamental task before us:
The single, all-encompassing problem of evidentialism is the determination of the state of a composite system that results after the replacement of one type of wall with another, or the removal of the wall altogether. That is, the fundamental problem is the description of evidential systems upon changes in internal constraints in a closed, composite system. Actually, this language is not ours: we are paraphrasing Callen's description of the fundamental problem of thermodynamics (Callen, 1985, p. 26) . As it happens, this fundamental problem of thermodynamics required for its solution an absolute scale for the measurement of temperature. The development of thermodynamics as a field and the rigorous definition of temperature were inextricably intertwined developments in modern physics.
Is the apparent parallelism between the evidential problem and the thermodynamic one purely the result of somewhat tortured linguistic manipulations (talk of "flow of evidential energy" and "removal of evidential walls")? Or, can we give explicit mathematical instantiation to these concepts on the evidential side? Together with our colleagues Jayajit Das and Sang-Cheol Seok, we have begun the task of filling in the details (Figure 3) . (See also Vieland, 2011, for further discussion.) Whether the mathematics of thermodynamics can be directly harnessed to yield an absolute measure of evidence as proposed in Vieland (2011) remains to be seen. But one way or another, we cannot meaningfully discuss measurement of statistical evidence without being clear on fundamental issues of measurement. Without this we utterly lack the requisite methodology for assessing whether or not we are successfully measuring the thing we have set out to measure.
HEADLINES OF THE FUTURE
We need to move beyond using stock statistical methods for purposes for which they were not designed and for which they are ill suited; and we need to move towards rigorous methods for using statistical equations for measuring evidence. The cost is the hard work and discomfort of living in between established bodies of statistical theory and as yet to be invented, radically different methodological environments. In the mean time, there will inevitably be discontinuity between vitally important ongoing work on statistical methods for biomedical research in existing frameworks, on the one hand, and calibration against newly developed evidence scales on the other hand. It is like being a teenager, an awkward and fraught developmental stage that nevertheless has to be endured. We do not see a choice.
But the payoffs of rethinking the foundations of our field will be tremendous. Armed with a well-behaved evidential metric scale, we believe that statistical methods will become more scientifically useful. Success in this endeavor will increase the scope of the relevance of statistical analyses, as a wider variety of biologists learn to trust the outcomes of statistical data analyses as reliable experimental tools; it may even extend methods for measurement of evidence to other essential areas of biomathematics, such as nonlinear dynamical modeling. It will serve as a necessary springboard to truly rigorous systems biology, in which we measure evidence across not only distinct data sets but even distinct experimental modalities. Above all, it will put evidence-based medicine on a solid evidential footing for the first time.
Just imagine the headlines: "Odds are, it's absolutely correct!" "The truth prevails!" "Why most published research findings are true!" 
Carnot cycles
The Carnot cycle is a mathematical construct fundamental to the measurement of temperature in thermodynamics (Fermi, 1956 
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